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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity in which players cooperate with unacquainted other
players having good reputations is a mechanism for cooperation in relatively
large populations subjected to social dilemma situations. When the pop-
ulation has group structure, as is often found in social networks, players
in experiments are considered to show behavior that deviates from existing
theoretical models of indirect reciprocity. First, players often show ingroup
favoritism (i.e., cooperation only within the group) rather than full cooper-
ation (i.e., cooperation within and across groups), even though the latter is
Pareto efficient. Second, in general, humans approximate outgroup members’
personal characteristics, presumably including the reputation used for indi-
rect reciprocity, by a single value attached to the group. Humans use such a
stereotypic approximation, a phenomenon known as outgroup homogeneity
in social psychology. I propose a model of indirect reciprocity in populations
with group structure to examine the possibility of ingroup favoritism and
full cooperation. In accordance with outgroup homogeneity, I assume that
players approximate outgroup members’ personal reputations by a single rep-
utation value attached to the group. I show that ingroup favoritism and full
cooperation are stable under different social norms (i.e., rules for assigning
reputations) such that they do not coexist in a single model. If players are
forced to consistently use the same social norm for assessing different types
of interactions (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup interactions), only full coopera-
tion survives. The discovered mechanism is distinct from any form of group
selection. The results also suggest potential methods for reducing ingroup
bias to shift the equilibrium from ingroup favoritism to full cooperation.
2
1. Introduction
Humans and other animals often show cooperation in social dilemma situ-
ations, in which defection apparently seems more lucrative than cooperation.
A main mechanism governing cooperation in such situations is direct reci-
procity, in which the same pairs of players repeatedly interact to realize mu-
tual cooperation (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006a). In fact, indi-
viduals who do not repeatedly interact also cooperate with others. In this sit-
uation, reputation-based indirect reciprocity, also known as downstream reci-
procity, is a viable mechanism for cooperation (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a;
Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004, 2007; Nowak and Sigmund,
2005; Brandt and Sigmund, 2005, 2006). In this mechanism, which I refer to
as indirect reciprocity for simplicity, individuals carry their own reputation
scores, which represent an evaluation of their past actions toward others. In-
dividuals are motivated to cooperate to gain good reputations so that they
are helped by others in the future or to reward (punish) good (bad) others.
Indirect reciprocity facilitates cooperation in a larger population than in the
case of direct reciprocity because unacquainted players can cooperate with
each other. Although evidence of indirect reciprocity is relatively scarce for
nonhumans (but see Bshary and Grutter (2006)), it is widely accepted as
explanation for cooperation in humans (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005).
Humans, in particular, belong to groups identified by traits, such as age,
ethnicity, and culture. Individuals presumably interact more frequently with
ingroup than outgroup members. Group structure has been a main topic of
research in social psychology and sociology for many decades (Brown, 2000;
Dovidio et al., 2005) and in network science (Fortunato, 2010). Experimental
evidence suggests that, when the population of players has group structure,
two phenomena that are not captured by existing models of indirect reci-
procity take place.
First, in group-structured populations, humans (Sedikides et al., 1998;
Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002; Dovidio et al., 2005; Efferson et al., 2008)
and even insect larvae (Lize et al., 2006) show various forms of ingroup fa-
voritism. In social dilemma games, individuals behave more cooperatively to-
ward ingroup than outgroup members (e.g., De Cremer and van Vugt (1999);
Goette et al. (2006); Fowler and Kam (2007); Rand et al. (2009); Yamagishi et al.
(1998, 1999); Yamagishi and Mifune (2008)). Ingroup favoritism in social
dilemma situations may occur as a result of indirect reciprocity confined in
the group (Yamagishi et al., 1998, 1999; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008). In
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contrast, ingroup favoritism in social dilemma games is not Pareto efficient
because individuals would receive larger payoffs if they also cooperated across
groups. Under what conditions are ingroup favoritism and intergroup coop-
eration sustained by indirect reciprocity? Can they bistable?
Ingroup favoritism, which has also been analyzed in the context of tag-
based cooperation, the green beard effect, and the armpit effect, has been
considered to be a theoretical challenge (e.g., Antal et al. (2009)). Never-
theless, recent research has revealed their mechanisms, including the loose
coupling of altruistic trait and tag in inheritance (Jansen and van Baalen,
2006), a relatively fast mutation that simultaneously changes strategy and
tag (Traulsen and Nowak, 2007; Traulsen, 2008), a tag’s relatively fast mu-
tation as compared to the strategy’s mutation (Antal et al., 2009), conflicts
between groups (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Garc´ıa and van den Bergh, 2011),
partial knowledge of others’ strategies (Masuda and Ohtsuki, 2007), and
gene-culture coevolution (Ihara, 2011). However, indirect reciprocity ac-
counts for ingroup favoritism, as is relevant to previous experiments (Yamagishi et al.,
1998, 1999; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008) is lacking.
Second, in a population with group structure, individuals tend to approx-
imate outgroup individuals’ characteristics by a single value attached to the
group. This type of stereotype is known as outgroup homogeneity in social
psychology (Jones et al., 1981; Ostrom and Sedikides, 1992; Sedikides et al.,
1998; Brown, 2000), and it posits that outgroup members tend to be regarded
to resemble each other more than they actually do. It is also reasonable from
the viewpoint of cognitive burden of remembering each individual’s proper-
ties that humans generally resort to outgroup homogeneity. Therefore, in
indirect reciprocity games in group structured populations, it seems to be
natural to assume outgroup homogeneity. In other words, individuals may
not care about or have access to personal reputations of those in different
groups and approximate an outgroup individual’s reputation by a group rep-
utation.
Some previous models analyzed the situations in which players do not
have access to individuals’ reputations. This is simply because it may be
difficult for an individual in a large population to separately keep track of
other people’s reputations even if gossiping helps dissemination of informa-
tion. This case of incomplete information has been theoretically modeled
by introducing the probability that an individual sees others’ reputations in
each interaction (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b,a; Brandt and Sigmund, 2005,
2006; Suzuki and Toquenaga, 2005; Nakamura and Masuda, 2011). However,
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these studies do not have to do with the approximation of individuals’ per-
sonal reputations by group reputations.
By analyzing a model of an indirect reciprocity game based on group
reputation, I provide an indirect reciprocity account for ingroup favoritism
for the first time. In addition, through an exhaustive search, I identify all the
different types of stable homogeneous populations that yield full cooperation
(intragroup and intergroup cooperation) or ingroup favoritism.
2. Methods
2.1. Model
2.1.1. Population structure and the donation game
I assume that the population is composed of infinitely many groups each
of which is of infinite size. Each player belongs to one group.
Players are involved in a series of the donation game, which is essentially
a type of prisoner’s dilemma game. In each round, a donor and recipient are
selected from the population in a completely random manner. Each player
is equally likely to be selected as donor or recipient. The donor may refer to
the recipient’s reputation and select one of the two actions, cooperation (C)
or defection (D). If the donor cooperates, the donor pays cost c > 0, and the
recipient receives benefit b(> c). If the donor defects, the payoffs to the donor
and recipient are equal to 0. Because the roles are asymmetric in a single
game, the present game differs from the one-shot or standard iterated versions
of the prisoner’s dilemma game. This game is widely used for studying mech-
anisms for cooperation including indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund,
2005; Nowak, 2006a,b).
Rounds are repeated a sufficient number of times with different pairs of
donors and recipients. Because the population is infinite, no pair of players
meets more than once, thereby avoiding the possibility of direct reciprocity
(e.g., Nowak and Sigmund (1998a); Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004)). The payoff
to each player is defined as the average payoff per round.
The groups to which the donor and recipient belong are denoted by gd
and gr, respectively. The simultaneously selected donor and recipient belong
to the same group with probability rin (i.e., gd = gr; Fig. 1A) and different
groups with probability rout ≡ 1− rin (i.e., gd 6= gr; Fig. 1B).
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2.1.2. Social norms
At the end of each round, observers assign binary reputations, good (G)
or bad (B), to the donor and donor’s group (gd) according to a given social
norm. I consider up to so-called second-order social norms with which the
observers assign G or B as a function of the donor’s action and the reputation
(i.e., G or B) of the recipient or recipient’s group (gr). Representative second-
order social norms are shown in Fig. 2. Under image scoring (“scoring” in
Fig. 2), an observer regards a donor’s action C or D to be G or B, respec-
tively, regardless of the recipient’s reputation. In the absence of a group-
structured population, scoring does not realize cooperation based on indirect
reciprocity unless certain specific conditions are met (Nowak and Sigmund,
1998a; Brandt and Sigmund, 2005, 2006; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001;
Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). Simple standing (“standing” in Fig. 2), and stern
judging (“judging” in Fig. 2; also known as Kandori) enable full coopera-
tion (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). Shunning
also enables full cooperation if the players’ reputations are initially C and
the number of rounds is finite (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2007) or if the players’
reputations are partially invisible (Nakamura and Masuda, 2011).
In the presence of group structure, four possible locations of the observer
are schematically shown in Fig. 1. I call the observer belonging to gd an
“ingroup” observer. Otherwise, the observer is called an “outgroup” observer.
The observers can adopt different social norms for the four cases, as sum-
marized in Fig. 1. When the donor and recipient belong to the same group
(Fig. 1A), the ingroup observer uses the norm denoted by sii to update the
donor’s personal reputation. In this situation, the outgroup observer does
not update the donor’s or gd’s reputation (but see Appendix A). When the
donor and recipient belong to different groups (Fig. 1B), the ingroup observer
uses the norm denoted by sio to update the donor’s personal reputation. In
this situation, the outgroup observer uses the norm denoted by soo to update
gd’s reputation. These four cases are explained in more detail in Sec. 2.1.4.
The distinction between sii and sio allows the ingroup observer to use a
double standard for assessing donors. For example, a donor defecting against
an ingroup G recipient may be regarded to be B, whereas a defection against
an outgroup G recipient may be regarded as G. Such different assessments
would not be allowed if sii and sio are not distinguished.
I call sii, sio, and soo subnorms. All the players are assumed to share the
subnorms. The typical norms shown in Fig. 2 can be used as subnorms. A
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subnorm is specified by assigning G or B to each combination of the donor’s
action (i.e., C or D) and recipient’s reputation (i.e., G or B). Therefore, there
are 24 = 16 subnorms. An entire social norm of a population consists of a
combination of the three subnorms, and there are 163 = 4096 social norms.
2.1.3. Action rule
The action rule refers to the mapping from the recipient’s reputation (i.e.,
G or B) to the donor’s action (i.e., C or D). The AllC and AllD donors coop-
erate and defect, respectively, regardless of the recipient’s reputation. A dis-
criminator (Disc) donor cooperates or defects when the recipient’s reputation
is G or B, respectively. An anti-discriminator (AntiDisc) donor cooperates
or defects when the recipient’s reputation is B or G, respectively.
The donor is allowed to use different action rules toward ingroup and
outgroup recipients. For example, a donor who adopts AllC and AllD to-
ward ingroup and outgroup recipients, respectively, implements reputation-
independent ingroup favoritism. There are 4× 4 = 16 action rules. A donor
refers to the recipient’s personal reputation when gd = gr (Fig. 1A) and to
gr’s group reputation when gd 6= gr (Fig. 1B).
2.1.4. Reputation updates
In each round, the ingroup and outgroup observers update the donor’s
and gd’s reputations, respectively.
If gd = gr, the donor is assumed to recognize the recipient’s personal rep-
utation (Fig. 1A). An ingroup observer in this situation updates the donor’s
personal reputation on the basis of the donor’s action, the recipient’s per-
sonal reputation, and subnorm sii. An outgroup observer in this situation
is assumed not to update gd’s reputation because such an observer does not
know the recipient’s personal reputation, although the donor does. Then, the
outgroup observer may want to refrain from evaluating the donor because the
donor and the observer use different information about the recipient. I also
analyzed a variant of the model in which the outgroup observer updates
gd’s reputation in this situation. The results are roughly the same as those
obtained for the original model (Appendix A).
If gd 6= gr, the donor is assumed to recognize gr’s reputation, but not
the recipient’s personal reputation (Fig. 1B). An ingroup observer in this
situation updates the donor’s personal reputation on the basis of the donor’s
action, gr’s reputation, and subnorm sio. Both the donor and observer refer
to gr’s reputation and not to the recipient’s personal reputation. An outgroup
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observer in this situation updates gd’s reputation based on the donor’s action,
gr’s reputation, and subnorm soo.
An outgroup observer knows the recipient’s personal reputation if the ob-
server and recipient are in the same group. However, the observer is assumed
to ignore this information for two reasons. First, it is evident for the observer
that the donor does not have access to the recipient’s personal reputation. To
explain the second reason, let us consider an outgroup observer who belongs
to gr in a certain round. Assume that this observer assigns a new reputa-
tion to gd according to a subnorm different from one used when the observer
does not belong to gr. The same observer does not belong to gr when the
observer updates the gd’s group reputation next time. This is because the
probability that the observer belongs to gr is infinitesimally small because
of the assumption of infinite groups. Therefore, the subnorm used when the
observer belongs to gr is rarely used and immaterial in the present model.
Finally, observers commit reputation assessment error. With probability
ǫ, ingroup and outgroup observers independently assign the reputation op-
posite to the intended one to the donor and gd, respectively. I introduce this
error because G and B players must coexist in the population to distinguish
the payoff values for different pairs of action rule and social norm (action–
norm pair); such a distinction is necessary for the stability analysis in the
following discussion. For simplicity, I neglect other types of error.
2.1.5. Mutant types
To examine the stability of an action rule under a given social norm, I
consider two types of mutants.
The first is a single mutant that invades a group. There are 16− 1 = 15
types of single mutants. A single mutant does not affect the action rule,
norm, or reputation of the group that the mutant belongs to because of the
assumption of infinite group size.
The second type is a group mutant. A homogeneous group composed of
mutants may make the mutant type stronger than the resident type. For
example, a group composed of players who cooperate with ingroup recipients
and defect against outgroup recipients may invade a fully cooperative popu-
lation if any intergroup interaction (i.e., C or D) is regarded to be G under
soo. By definition, a group mutant is a homogeneous group of mutants that
is different from the resident players in either the action rule or social norm.
I consider two varieties of group mutants, as described in Sec. 3.
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2.2. Analysis methods
2.2.1. Reputation scores in the equilibrium
Consider a homogeneous resident population in which all players share
an action–norm pair. I will examine the stability of this population against
invasion by single and group mutants. For this purpose, I calculate the
fraction of players with a G reputation, probability of cooperation, and payoff
after infinitely many rounds.
Denote by p∗ and p∗g the equilibrium probabilities that the player’s and
group’s reputations are G, respectively. The self-consistent equation for p∗
is given by
p∗ = rin
[
p∗ΦinG(σ
in) + (1− p∗)ΦinB (σin)
]
+rout
[
p∗gΦ
in
G(σ
out) + (1− p∗g)ΦinB (σout)
]
,
(1)
where σin and σout are the action rules (i.e., AllC, Disc, AntiDisc, or AllD)
that the donor adopts toward ingroup and outgroup recipients, respectively.
ΦinG(σ
in) and ΦinB (σ
in) are the probabilities that the ingroup observer, based
on sii, assigns reputation G to a donor who has played with a G or B in-
group recipient (i.e., gd = gr), respectively (Fig. 1A). Similarly Φ
in
G(σ
out) and
ΦinB (σ
out) apply when the recipient is in a different group (i.e., gd 6= gr) and
the observer uses sio (Fig. 1B). It should be noted that Φ
in
G(σ
in) and ΦinG(σ
out),
for example, may differ from each other even if σin = σout. Owing to the rep-
utation assignment error, ΦinG(σ
in), ΦinB (σ
in), ΦinG(σ
out), ΦinB (σ
out) ∈ {ǫ, 1 − ǫ}
holds true. For example, if the donor is Disc toward ingroup recipients and
subnorm sii is scoring, Φ
in
G(σ
in) = 1− ǫ and ΦinB (σin) = ǫ.
The self-consistent equation for p∗g is given by
p∗g = r
inp∗g + r
out
[
p∗gΦ
out
G (σ
out) + (1− p∗g)ΦoutB (σout)
]
, (2)
where ΦoutG (σ
out) ∈ {ǫ, 1− ǫ} and ΦoutB (σout) ∈ {ǫ, 1− ǫ} are the probabilities
that the outgroup observer, based on soo, assigns reputation G to the donor’s
group when the donor has played with a G or B outgroup recipient (i.e.,
gd 6= gr), respectively (Fig. 1B). The first term on the right-hand side of
Eq. (2) corresponds to the fact that gd’s reputation is not updated in the
situation illustrated in Fig. 1A.
Equations (1) and (2) lead to
p∗ =
rinΦinB (σ
in) + rout
[
p∗gΦ
in
G(σ
out) + (1− p∗g)ΦinB (σout)
]
1− rinΦinG(σin) + rinΦinB (σin)
(3)
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and
p∗g =
routΦoutB (σ
out)
1− rin − routΦoutG (σout) + routΦoutB (σout)
. (4)
2.2.2. Stability against invasion by single mutants
To examine the stability of the action rule (σin, σout) against invasion by
single mutants under a given social norm, I consider a single mutant with
action rule (σin′, σout′). Because the group is assumed to be infinitely large,
a single mutant does not change the reputation of the invaded group. The
equilibrium probability p′∗ that a mutant receives personal reputation G is
given by
p′∗ = rin
[
p∗ΦinG(σ
in′) + (1− p∗)ΦinB (σin′)
]
+rout
[
p∗gΦ
in
G(σ
out′) + (1− p∗g)ΦinB (σout′)
]
.
(5)
When the probability that the donor and gd have a G reputation is equal
to p and pg, respectively, the resident donor cooperates with probability
rinΨ(σin, p) + routΨ(σout, pg), (6)
where
Ψ(σ˜, p˜) = p˜ζG(σ˜) + (1− p˜)ζB(σ˜) (p˜ = p, pg) (7)
is the probability that a donor with action rule σ˜ ∈ {AllC, Disc, AntiDisc, AllD}
cooperates when the recipient’s personal or group reputation is G with prob-
ability p˜. ζG(σ˜) and ζB(σ˜) (σ˜ = σ
in or σout) are the probabilities that a
σ˜ donor cooperates with a G and B recipient, respectively. AllC, Disc, An-
tiDisc, and AllD correspond to (ζG(σ˜), ζB(σ˜)) = (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0),
respectively.
The payoff to a resident (σin, σout)–player is given by
π = −c [rinΨ(σin, p∗) + routΨ(σout, p∗g)
]
+ b
[
rinΨ(σin, p∗) + routΨ(σout, p∗g)
]
.
(8)
The payoff to a (σin′, σout′)–mutant invading the homogeneous population of
the resident action–norm pair is given by
π′ = −c [rinΨ(σin′, p∗) + routΨ(σout′, p∗g)
]
+b
[
rinΨ(σin, p′∗) + routΨ(σout, p∗g)
]
.
(9)
If π > π′ for any mutant, the pair of the action rule (σin, σout) and social
norm (sii, sio, soo) is stable against invasion by single mutants.
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2.2.3. Stability against invasion by group mutants
For a mutant group composed of players sharing an action–norm pair,
let p′∗g denote the equilibrium probability that the mutant group has group
reputation G. I obtain
p′∗ =rin
[
p′∗Φin′G (σ
in′) + (1− p′∗)Φin′B (σin′)
]
+ rout
[
p∗gΦ
in′
G (σ
out′) + (1− p∗g)Φin′B (σout′)
]
(10)
and
p′∗g = r
inp′∗g + r
out
[
p∗gΦ
out
G (σ
out′) + (1− p∗g)ΦoutB (σout′)
]
, (11)
where Φin′G (σ
in′) or Φin′B (σ
in′) is the probability that an ingroup observer as-
signs reputation G to a mutant donor who has played with a G or B ingroup
recipient, respectively. Even if σin′ and σin are the same, Φin′G (σ
in′) will be
generally different from ΦinG(σ
in) because the ingroup observer in the mutant
group may use a subnorm sii that is different from one used in the resident
population. Parallel definitions apply to Φin′G (σ
out′) and Φin′B (σ
out′). Equa-
tions (10) and (11) yield
p′∗ =
rinΦin′B (σ
in′) + rout
[
p∗gΦ
in′
G (σ
out′) + (1− p∗g)Φin′B (σout′)
]
1− rinΦin′G (σin′) + rinΦin′B (σin′)
(12)
and
p′∗g = p
∗
gΦ
out
G (σ
out′) + (1− p∗g)ΦoutB (σout′), (13)
respectively.
The payoff to a mutant player in the mutant group is given by
π′g = −c
[
rinΨ(σin′, p′∗) + routΨ(σout′, p∗g)
]
+b
[
rinΨ(σin′, p′∗) + routΨ(σout, p′∗g )
]
.
(14)
If π > π′g holds true for any group mutant player, the resident population is
stable against invasion by group mutants.
3. Results
3.1. Action–norm pairs stable against invasion by single mutants
There are 16 action rules and 163 = 4096 social norms, which leads to
16 × 4096 = 65536 action–norm pairs. Because of the symmetry with re-
spect to the swapping of G and B, I neglect action–norm pairs in which the
action rule (i.e., AllC, Disc, AntiDisc, or AllD) toward ingroup recipients
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is σin = AntiDisc without loss of generality. Such an action–norm pair can
be converted to σin = Disc by swapping G and B in the action rule and
social norm. The model is also invariant if G and B group reputations are
completely swapped in the action rule toward outgroup recipients σout and
subnorms sio and soo. Therefore, I can also neglect the action–norm pairs
with σout = AntiDisc without loss of generality. This symmetry consideration
leaves 65536/4 = 16384 action–norm pairs (Fig. 3).
I exhaustively examined the stability of all 16×4096 = 65536 action–norm
pairs. A similar exhaustive search was first conducted in (Ohtsuki and Iwasa,
2004) for an indirect reciprocity game without group structure in the popula-
tion. In the following, π (Eq. (8)) mentions the player’s payoff in the resident
population in the limit of no reputation assignment error, i.e., ǫ→ 0.
I first describe action rules that are stable against invasion by single
mutants under a given social norm. I identified them using Eqs. (1)–(9).
Under any given social norm, action rule (σin, σout) = (AllD, AllD) is stable
and yields π = 0. Other action–norm pairs also yield π = 0, but there are
588 stable action–norm pairs with π > 0 (Fig. 3). For a given social norm,
at most one action rule that yields a positive payoff is stable. For all 588
solutions, the condition for stability against invasion by single mutants (i.e.,
π > π′, where π and π′ are given by Eqs. (8) and (9), respectively) is given
by
brin > c. (15)
Equation (15) implies that cooperation is likely when the benefit-to-cost ratio
is large, which is a standard result for different mechanisms of cooperation
in social dilemma games (Nowak, 2006b). Cooperation is also likely when
intragroup interaction is relatively more frequent than intergroup interaction
(i.e., large rin).
3.2. Stability against invasion by group mutants
The stability of these 588 action–norm pairs against invasion by group
mutants was also examined based on Eqs. (10)–(14). Properly setting the va-
riety of group mutants is not a trivial issue. At most, 65536−1 = 65535 types
of group mutants that differ from the resident population in either action rule
or social norm are possible. However, an arbitrarily selected homogeneous
mutant group may be fragile to invasion by different single mutants into the
mutant group. Although I do not model evolutionary dynamics, evolution
would not allow the emergence and maintenance of such weak mutant groups.
With this in mind, I consider two group mutation scenarios.
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3.2.1. Scenario 1
Single mutants may invade the resident population when Eq. (15) is vio-
lated. In this scenario 1, the mutants are assumed to differ from the resident
population in the action rule, but not the social norm, for simplicity. There
are 16 − 1 = 15 such mutants, and some of them, including (σin, σout) =
(AllD, AllD), can invade the resident population when 1 < b/c < 1/rin.
Such mutant action rules may spread to occupy a single group when Eq. (15)
is violated. I consider the stability of the resident population against the ho-
mogeneous groups of mutants that invade the resident population as single
mutants when 1 < b/c < 1/rin.
Among the 588 action–norm pairs that yield π > 0, 440 pairs are stable
against group mutation. Among these 440 pairs, I focus on those yielding per-
fect intragroup cooperation, i.e., those yielding limǫ→0Ψ(σ
in, p∗) = 1, where
Ψ and p∗ are given in Sec. 2.2. For the other stable pairs, see Appendix B.
This criterion is satisfied by 270 pairs (Fig. 3). For all 270 pairs, every player
obtains personal reputation G (i.e., limǫ→0 p
∗ = 1), and the donor cooperates
with ingroup recipients because the recipients have reputation G (i.e., σin =
Disc).
In all 270 pairs, sii is either standing (GBGG in shorthand notation),
judging (GBBG), or shunning (GBBB) (refer to Fig. 2 for definitions of
these norms). In the shorthand notation, the first, second, third, and fourth
letters (either G or B) indicate the donor’s or gd’s new reputation when the
donor cooperates with a G recipient, the donor defects against a G recipient,
the donor cooperates with a B recipient, and the donor defects against a B
recipient, respectively. Standing, judging, and shunning in sii are exchange-
able for any fixed combination of σin = Disc, σout, sio, and soo. Therefore,
there are 270/3 = 90 combinations of σout, sio, and soo, which are summa-
rized in Table 1. An asterisk indicates an entry that can be either G or B.
For example, GB∗G indicates standing (GBGG) or judging (GBBG). The
probability of cooperation toward outgroup recipients, payoff (π; Eq. (8)),
and the probability that a group has a G reputation (p∗g; Eq. (2)) are also
shown in Table 1. The stable action–norm pairs can be classified into three
categories.
• Full cooperation: Donors behave as Disc toward outgroup recipients,
i.e., σout = Disc and cooperate with both ingroup and outgroup recip-
ients with probability 1. Accordingly, π = b− c and p∗g = 1.
In this case, indirect reciprocity among different groups as well as that
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within single groups is realized. Action rule σin = σout =Disc is stable if
sio is either standing (GBGG), judging (GBBG), or shunning (GBBB)
and soo is either standing or judging. The condition for stability against
group mutation is the mildest one (i.e., b > c) for each action–norm
pair.
Under full cooperation, sio and sio must be one that stabilizes coop-
eration in the standard indirect reciprocity game without a group-
structured population (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004; Nowak and Sigmund,
2005; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2007). The ingroup observer monitors donors’
actions toward outgroup recipients through the use of sio = stand-
ing, judging, or shunning, even though ingroup players are not directly
harmed if donors defect against outgroup recipients. The ingroup ob-
server does so because donors’ defection against outgroup recipients
would negatively affect the group’s reputation.
• Partial ingroup favoritism: Donors adopt σout = Disc and cooperate
with ingroup recipients with probability 1 and outgroup recipients with
probability 1/2. Accordingly, π = (b− c)(1 + rin)/2 and p∗g = 1/2.
In this case, action rule σin = σout = Disc is stable if sio is either stand-
ing (GBGG) or judging (GBBG), and soo is either scoring (GBGB) or
shunning (GBBB). The condition for stability against group mutation
is shown in Table 2.
• Perfect ingroup favoritism: Donors adopt σout = AllD and always co-
operate with ingroup recipients and never with outgroup recipients re-
gardless of the recipient’s group reputation. Accordingly, π = (b−c)rin.
Table 1 suggests that action rule (σin, σout) = (Disc, AllD) can be
stable for any subnorm soo. This is true because the group reputation,
whose update rule is given by soo, is irrelevant in the current situation;
the donor anyways defects against outgroup recipients. Nevertheless,
soo determines sio that is consistent with ingroup cooperation through
the probability of a G group reputation p∗g.
When soo = ∗G∗G, the outgroup observer evaluates defection against
outgroup recipients to be G (Fig. 1B). Therefore, p∗g = 1. In this case,
sio = ∗GBB, ∗GBG, and ∗GGG stabilize perfect ingroup favoritism.
Under any of these sio, the ingroup observer assigns G to a donor that
defects against a recipient in a G outgroup because the second entry
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of sio is equal to G in each case. Therefore, p
∗ = 1, and full ingroup
cooperation is stable.
When soo = ∗G∗B or ∗B∗G, the outgroup observer evaluates defection
against outgroup recipients to be G with probability 1/2. Therefore,
p∗g = 1/2. In this case, sio = ∗G∗G stabilizes perfect ingroup favoritism.
Under such an sio, the ingroup observer assigns G to a donor that
defects against a recipient in a G outgroup because the second and
fourth entries of sio are equal to G.
When soo = ∗B∗B, the outgroup observer evaluates defection against
outgroup recipients to be B. Therefore, p∗g = 0. In this case, sio =
BB∗G, BG∗G, and GG∗G stabilize perfect ingroup favoritism. Under
such an sio, the ingroup observer assigns G to a donor that defects
against a recipient in a G outgroup because the fourth entry of sio is
equal to G.
In all the cases, the stability against invasion by group mutants requires
b > c.
3.2.2. Scenario 2
In scenario 2 of group mutation, it is hypothesized that a group of mu-
tants immigrates from a different population that is stable against invasion
by single mutants. Such a group mutant may appear owing to the encounter
of different stable cultures (i.e., action–norm pairs). The pairs that are stable
against invasion by single mutants and yield zero payoff, such as the pop-
ulation of AllD players, must be also included in the group mutant list. It
should be noted that a mutant group may have a different social norm from
that for the resident population.
Among the 588 action–norm pairs that are stable against single mutation,
no pair is stable against group mutation. However, 140 pairs are stable
against group mutation for any b > c in a relaxed sense that the resident
player’s payoff is not smaller than the group mutant’s payoff, i.e., π ≥ π′g
(Fig. 3). The homogeneous population of each pair is neutrally invaded by
some group mutants, i.e., π = π′g. Therefore, I examine the evolutionary
stability (e.g., Nowak (2006a)) against group mutation. In other words, for
the group mutants yielding π = π′g, I require π > π
′
g when the resident players
are replaced by group mutants.
All 140 action–norm pairs are evolutionarily stable except that each pair
is still neutrally invaded by their cousins. For example, four action–norm
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pairs specified by σin = σout = Disc, sii = GB∗G, sio = GB∗G, soo = GBGG
neutrally invade each other. These pairs yield the same payoff π = b − c
and are evolutionarily stable against invasion by the other group mutants.
Therefore, I conclude that the four pairs collectively form a set of stable
solutions. Other sets of stable solutions consist of four or eight neutrally
invadable action–norm pairs that yield the same payoff and differ only in sii
and sio.
All 140 pairs realize perfect intragroup cooperation such that the players
have G personal reputations and σin = Disc (Fig. 3). Subnorm sii = GBGG
(i.e., standing) or GBBG (i.e., judging) is exchangeable for any fixed com-
bination of σin = Disc, σout, sio, and soo. Therefore, there are 140/2 = 70
possible combinations of σout, sio, and soo, which are listed in Table 3. The
140 pairs are a subset of the 270 pairs stable under scenario 1. The sta-
ble sets of action–norm pairs can be classified into three categories. (1)
Full cooperation occurs if all the subnorms are standing or judging. As al-
ready mentioned as an example, under soo = GBGG, the four action–norm
pairs (σin, σout, sii, sio) = (Disc, Disc, GBGG, GBGG), (Disc, Disc, GBGG,
GBBG), (Disc, Disc, GBBG, GBGG), and (Disc, Disc, GBBG, GBBG) can
neutrally invade each other. Similarly, if soo = GBBG, the same four action–
norm pairs constitute a set realizing stable full cooperation. These two sets
of four pairs are evolutionarily stable against invasion by each other. In to-
tal, there are eight pairs that realize full cooperation. (2) Partial ingroup
favoritism occurs for a set of four action–norm pairs. (3) Perfect ingroup
favoritism occurs under the same subnorms soo as those for scenario 1. For a
fixed soo, the same eight action–norm pairs (σ
in, σout, sii, sio) = (Disc, AllD,
GB∗G, ∗G∗G) yield the same payoff π = (b−c)rin, can neutrally invade each
other, and are evolutionarily stable against the other group mutants.
3.3. When observers use simpler social norms
In fact, players may not differentiate between the three subnorms. Players
may use a common norm for assessing ingroup donors irrespective of the
location of recipients. Table 1 indicates that, if sii = sio is imposed for
the resident population, but not for mutants, perfect ingroup favoritism is
excluded. Under scenario 1, full cooperation is stable when sii = sio =
standing, judging, or shunning and soo = standing or judging. Partial ingroup
favoritism is stable when sii = sio = standing or judging and soo = scoring
or shunning. Under scenario 2, full cooperation is stable when sii = sio =
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standing or judging and soo = standing or judging. Partial ingroup favoritism
is stable when sii = sio = standing or judging and soo = shunning.
Alternatively, players may use a common norm for assessing donors play-
ing with outgroup recipients irrespective of the location of donors. If sii 6= sio
is allowed and sio = soo is imposed, partial ingroup favoritism is excluded.
Under scenario 1, full cooperation is stable when sii = standing, judging, or
shunning and sio = soo = standing or judging. Perfect ingroup favoritism is
stable when sii = standing, judging, or shunning and sio = soo = ∗G∗G. The
results under scenario 2 differ from those under scenario 1 only in that sii =
shunning is disallowed.
Finally, if all the three subnorms are forced to be equal, only full coop-
eration is stable, and the norm is standing or judging. This holds true for
both scenarios 1 and 2.
4. Discussion
4.1. Summary of the results
I identified the pairs of action rule and social norm that are stable against
invasion by single and group mutants in the game of group-structured indirect
reciprocity. Full cooperation (i.e., cooperation within and across groups)
based on personal and group reputations, partial ingroup favoritism, and
perfect ingroup favoritism are stable under different social norms. Perfect
ingroup favoritism is attained only when the donor defects against outgroup
recipients regardless of their reputation (i.e., σout = AllD). Perfect ingroup
favoritism does not occur with the combination of a donor that is ready
to cooperate with G outgroup recipients (i.e., σout = Disc) and a B group
reputation. The mechanism for ingroup favoritism revealed in this study is
distinct from those proposed previously (see Sec. 1).
The major condition for either full cooperation, partial ingroup favoritism,
and perfect ingroup favoritism, depending on the assumed social norm, is
given by brin > c. In only 3 out of 270 social norms in scenario 1, an additional
condition for rin is imposed (Sec. 3.2.1). In general, different mechanisms of
cooperation can be understood in an unified manner such that cooperation
occurs if and only if b/c is larger than a threshold value (Nowak, 2006b). For
example, b/c must be larger than the inverse of the relatedness parameter r
and the inverse of the discount factor in kin selection and direct reciprocity,
respectively. The present result also fits this view; rin corresponds to r in
the case of kin selection.
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I assumed that players approximate personal reputations of individuals in
other groups by group reputations (i.e., outgroup homogeneity). Adoption of
outgroup homogeneity may be evolutionarily beneficial for players owing to
the reduction in the cognitive burden of recognizing others’ personal reputa-
tions. Instead, the players pay potential costs of not being able to know the
personal reputations of individuals in other groups. To explore evolutionary
origins of group reputation, one has to examine competition between players
using the group reputation and players not using it. It would also be nec-
essary to introduce a parameter representing the cost of obtaining personal
reputations of outgroup individuals. Such an analysis is warranted for future
work.
All the players are assumed to use the same social norm. This assumption
may be justified for well-mixed populations but less so for populations with
group structure because group structure implies relatively little intergroup
communication. It seems to be more natural to assume that subnorms sii and
sio, which are used to evaluate actions of ingroup donors, depend on groups.
Under scenario 2 (Sec. 3.2.2), any stable action–norm pair is neutrally in-
vaded by its cousins who are different in sii and sio. This result implies that
different groups can use different norms. For example, for all the solutions
shown in Table 3, some groups can use sii = GBGG (i.e., standing), while
other groups in the same population can use sio = GBBG (i.e., judging). To
better understand the possibility of heterogeneous social norms, analyzing
a population composed of a small number of groups, probably by different
methods, would be helpful.
4.2. Cooperation based on group reputation is distinct from group selection
Indirect reciprocity based on group reputation is distinct from any type of
group selection. This is true for both full cooperation and ingroup favoritism.
There are two dominant variants of group selection that serve as mechanisms
for cooperation in social dilemma games (West et al., 2007, 2008).
The first type is group competition, in which selection pressure acts on
groups such that a group with a large mean payoff would replace one with a
small mean payoff. Models with group competition induce ingroup favoritism
(Choi and Bowles, 2007; Garc´ıa and van den Bergh, 2011), altruistic punish-
ment (Boyd et al., 2003), and evolution of the judging social norm in the
standard game of indirect reciprocity whereby players interact within each
group (Pacheco et al., 2006; Chalub et al., 2006). In contrast, the present
18
study is not concerned with evolutionary dynamics including group compe-
tition. The group mutant is assumed to statically compare the payoff to the
resident group with that to the mutant group.
The second type of group selection requires assortative reproduction in
the sense that the offspring have a higher probability of belonging to specific
groups than to other groups depending on the offspring’s genotype. It is
mathematically identical with kin selection (West et al., 2007, 2008). This
variant of group selection is also irrelevant to the present model, which is not
concerned with the reproduction process.
The analysis in this study is purely static. I avoided examining evolu-
tionary dynamics for two reasons. First, the discovered mechanism for coop-
eration may be confused with group selection in the presence of evolutionary
dynamics. Second, the model becomes needlessly complicated. Introduc-
ing evolutionary dynamics implies that one specifies a rule for reproduction.
Offspring may be assumed to belong to the parent’s group or to migrate to
another group. It may then be necessary to consider the treatment of, for
example, the heterogeneous group size. Because evolutionary dynamics are
neglected, the present model explains neither emergence of full cooperation
and ingroup favoritism nor the likelihood of different solutions, which is a
main limitation of the present study.
I stress that the concept of group mutants is introduced to sift the set of
stable action–norm pairs. Unless group competition is assumed, the concept
of group mutants does not particularly promote cooperation in evolutionary
dynamics.
4.3. Group competition can enable full cooperation and ingroup favoritism
even if brin > c is violated
Under a proper social norm, full cooperation or ingroup favoritism is
stable if brin > c (i.e., Eq. (15) is satisfied) in most cases. With proba-
bility rin, the donor, recipient, and observer are engaged in the standard
(i.e., no group structure) indirect reciprocity game limited to a single group
(Fig. 1A). In the standard indirect reciprocity game under incomplete infor-
mation, bq > c is quite often the condition for cooperation, where q is the
probability that the recipient’s reputation is observed. This holds true when
q indicates the observation probability for the donor (Nowak and Sigmund,
1998b,a; Brandt and Sigmund, 2005, 2006; Suzuki and Toquenaga, 2005) or
that for both the donor and observer (Nakamura and Masuda, 2011). Be-
cause rin is also equal to the probability that the donor sees the recipient’s
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personal reputation, rin resembles q. In fact, replacing rin by q in Eq. (15)
yields bq > c.
If a player is capable of recognizing the personal reputation of a fixed num-
ber of others, the maximum population size for which indirect reciprocity is
possible in the standard indirect reciprocity game scales as 1/q. The con-
sistency between Eq. (15) and bq > c implies that the concept of group
reputation does not increase the maximum population size for which indirect
reciprocity occurs. However, under group competition (Sec. 4.2), full coop-
eration and ingroup favoritism can be stable even if the restriction imposed
by Eq. (15) is removed.
To explain this point, assume that the population is subjected to evolu-
tionary dynamics such that players with relatively large payoffs would bear
more offspring in the same group and group competition occurs. The rate of
group competition is denoted by 1/tgc, where tgc is the mean time interval
between successive group competition events. Emergence of a single mutant
occurs with rate 1/tm. Selection and reproduction of single players occur
with rate 1/ts.
If Eq. (15) is violated, single mutants emerge in time ∝ tm. Then, some
types of mutants, including the AllD mutant, spread in the invaded group in
time ∝ ts under scenario 1 of group mutation. The invaded group presumably
possesses a smaller group-averaged payoff than other resident groups because
the resident population is stable against invasion by group mutants as long
as b > c, in all but three of 270 action–norm pairs (Table 2). If 1/tgc ≫ 1/tm,
such an invaded group is likely to be eradicated by group competition because
group competition occurs much faster than the emergence of single mutants.
In this case, full cooperation or ingroup favoritism, depending on the given
social norm, can be maintained in the absence of Eq. (15). This discussion
does not involve timescale ts.
Group competition is needed to remove Eq. (15). If Eq. (15) is imposed,
cooperation occurs without group competition.
4.4. Relationship to previous behavioral experiments
In this section, I discuss possible linkages between the present model
and the previous experiments examining indirect reciprocity and third-party
punishments.
Yamagishi and colleagues conducted a series of laboratory experiments to
show that ingroup favoritism is induced by a group heuristic (Yamagishi et al.,
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1998, 1999; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008). With a group heuristic, donors co-
operate with ingroup recipients because the donors expect repayment from
other ingroup players. Donors do not use the information about others’ rep-
utations in these experiments. In contrast, players use personal reputations
of ingroup members in the present model. Nevertheless, the previous exper-
iments and the current model do not contradict each other.
In another laboratory experiment, Mifune et al. showed that presentation
of eye-like painting promotes donor’s cooperation toward ingroup recipients
in the dictator game (Mifune et al., 2010). For expository purposes, I define
serious subnorm to be either standing, judging, or shunning. If the eye-
like painting approximates an ingroup observer obeying a serious subnorm,
this experimental result is consistent with the present theory because ingroup
cooperation is theoretically stable when the ingroup observer adopts a serious
subnorm. Because the painting does not increase the cooperation toward
outgroup recipients (Mifune et al., 2010), it may not turn sio to a serious
subnorm for some psychological reason. Humans may use double standards,
i.e., sii 6= sio, which favor ingroup favoritism in my model.
Other behavioral experiments have addressed the relationship between
third-party altruistic punishments and ingroup favoritism (Bernhard et al.,
2006; Shinada et al., 2004). In precise terms, third-party punishments and
reputation-based indirect reciprocity are distinct mechanisms for cooperation
(Sigmund et al., 2001; Ohtsuki et al., 2009). Nevertheless, below I discuss
possible linkages between these experiments and my model.
In indigenous communities in Papua New Guinea (Bernhard et al., 2006),
the amount of punishment is larger if the punisher belongs to the donor’s
group than to a different group (compare ABC and AB cases in their Fig.
1). Their results suggest that the ingroup observer may use a serious subnorm
and the outgroup observer may not. Furthermore, given that the punisher
is in the donor’s group, the amount of punishment is larger if the donor and
recipient belong to the same group (Fig. 1A, if the punisher is identified
with the ingroup observer) than if they belong to different groups (Fig. 1B;
compare the ABC and AC cases in Fig. 1 of Bernhard et al. (2006)). In
this situation, the ingroup observer may use a serious subnorm sii when the
donor plays with ingroup recipients (Fig. 1A) and use a nonserious subnorm
sio when the donor plays with outgroup recipients (Fig. 1B). My model re-
produces ingroup favoritism under these conditions.
However, my model and others are not concerned with a main finding in
(Bernhard et al., 2006) that the amount of punishment is larger when the
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punisher and recipient belong to the same group. For the reasons stated in
Sec. 2.1.4, I did not assume that observers make their judgments differently
when they belong to the recipient’s group gr and to a different group. To
theoretically explain the main finding in Bernhard et al. (2006), one should
explicitly analyze the case of a finite number of groups.
In different laboratory experiments, the amount of punishment is larger
for an ingroup donor’s defection than an outgroup donor’s defection (Shinada et al.,
2004). My results are consistent with their results in that, for ingroup fa-
voritism, the donor’s action must be seriously evaluated by the ingroup ob-
server using sii and not seriously by the outgroup observer using soo.
4.5. Reduction of ingroup favoritism
Although ingroup favoritism seems to be a canonical behavior of hu-
mans, reduction of ingroup bias would induce intergroup cooperation and
is socially preferable (Yamagishi et al., 1998). Full cooperation is Pareto
efficient, whereas ingroup favoritism is not. Various psychological and so-
ciological mechanisms for reducing the ingroup bias, such as guilt, “auto-
motive” control, retraining, empathy, and decategorization have been pro-
posed (Hewstone et al., 2002; Dovidio et al., 2005; Sedikides et al., 1998).
My results provide theory-based possibilities of reducing ingroup bias.
First, if the social norm is fixed, conversion from ingroup favoritism to full
cooperation is theoretically impossible because full cooperation and ingroup
favoritism do not coexist under a given social norm. Therefore, advising
players to change their behavior toward outgroup recipients from AllD to Disc
is not recommended unless the social norm is also altered. Conversion from
ingroup favoritism to full cooperation requires a change in the social norm
such that players as observers seriously assess ingroup donors’ actions toward
outgroup recipients (with sio) and outgroup–outgroup interaction (with soo).
In particular, if sio is a serious subnorm, perfect ingroup favoritism with no
intergroup cooperation disappears (Sec. 3.3).
Second, if the three subnorms are the same, the perfect and partial in-
group favoritism is eradicated. The coincidence of only two subnorms is in-
sufficient to induce full cooperation (Sec. 3.3). The subnorms sii = sio = soo
that exclude the ingroup bias and realize full cooperation are standing or
judging. Therefore, without speaking of serious subnorms, forcing players to
use the same subnorms consistently in assessing donors in different situations
may be also effective in inducing full cooperation.
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Ingroup favoritism has been mostly an experimental question except for
some recent theoretical studies. This study is a first step toward under-
standing and even manipulating the dichotomy between full cooperation and
ingroup favoritism in the context of indirect reciprocity.
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Appendix A: A variant of the model with different reputation dy-
namics
In this section, I analyze a variant of the model in which outgroup ob-
servers update the group reputation of donors involved in ingroup interaction
(i.e., gd = gr).
Reputation dynamics
I assume that the outgroup observer uses the donor’s action, the recipi-
ent’s personal reputation, and soo, to update gd’s (not the donor’s personal)
reputation.
The equivalent of Eq. (2) under this reputation update rule is given by
p∗g = r
in
[
p∗ΦoutG (σ
in) + (1− p∗)ΦoutB (σin)
]
+rout
[
p∗gΦ
out
G (σ
out) + (1− p∗g)ΦoutB (σout)
]
.
(16)
I obtain p∗ and p∗g by solving the set of linear equations (1) and (16). Equa-
tions (5)–(10), and (12) are unchanged. As compared to the case of the
original reputation update rule (original case for short), Eq. (11) is replaced
by
p′∗g =r
in
[
p′∗ΦoutG (σ
in′) + (1− p′∗)ΦoutB (σin′)
]
+ rout
[
p∗gΦ
out
G (σ
out′) + (1− p∗g)ΦoutB (σout′)
]
. (17)
The equivalent of Eq. (13) is obtained by substituting Eq. (12) in Eq. (17).
Because of the symmetry with respect to G and B, I exclude action rules
having σin = AntiDisc from the exhaustive search, as I did in the original
case (Sec. 3.1). It should be noted that one cannot eliminate action–norm
pairs with σout = AntiDisc on the basis of symmetry consideration, which is
different from the original case. This is because a player’s personal and group
reputations are interrelated through the behavior of the outgroup observer
when gd = gr.
Results
Under the modified reputation update rule, there are 725 action–norm
pairs that are stable against invasion by single mutants and yield π > 0.
Under scenario 1, 507 out of the 725 pairs are stable against group mu-
tation, and 324 out of the 507 pairs yield perfect ingroup cooperation. The
324 action–norm pairs are classified as follows. First, 68 pairs yield full co-
operation with either (σin, σout) = (Disc, Disc) or (Disc, AntiDisc). Second,
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14 pairs yield partial ingroup favoritism with (σin, σout) = (Disc, AntiDisc).
Third, 236 pairs yield perfect ingroup favoritism with (σin, σout) = (Disc,
AllD). Fourth, 6 pairs yield perfect ingroup favoritism with (σin, σout) =
(Disc, AntiDisc).
As in the original case, σin = Disc, and sii is either standing, judging,
or shunning for these pairs. In contrast to the original case, (σin, σout) =
(Disc, AntiDisc) can be stable, yield perfect ingroup cooperation, and even
yield outgroup cooperation, under some social norms. In such a situation,
the values of the personal and group reputations (i.e., G and B) have op-
posite meanings. In other words, a G but not B personal reputation elicits
intragroup cooperation, while a B but not G group reputation elicits inter-
group cooperation. Therefore, action rule (σin, σout) = (Disc, AntiDisc) in
this situation can be regarded as a relative of (σin, σout) = (Disc, Disc) in the
situation in which the values of the personal and group reputations have the
same meaning. On this basis, I consider that the present results are similar
to those obtained for the original case (Table 1). In particular, only full co-
operation is stable under standing or judging if sii, sio, and soo are assumed
to be the same.
Under scenario 2, 144 out of 725 pairs are stable against group mutation,
and all of them yield perfect ingroup cooperation. The 140 pairs that survive
in the original case (Sec. 3.2.2) also survive under the modified reputation
update rule. The action rule in the additional four (= 144 − 140) pairs is
(σin, σout) = (Disc, AntiDisc). Another difference from the original case is
that the action–norm pairs that yield partial ingroup favoritism in Table 3
realize full cooperation in the present case. Otherwise, the results are the
same as those in the original case. In summary, 16 pairs realize full coop-
eration, and 128 pairs realize perfect ingroup favoritism. As is the case for
scenario 1, only full cooperation is stable with standing or judging if the three
subnorms are assumed to be the same.
Appendix B: The rest of the stable action–norm pairs under sce-
nario 1
Under sceinario 1 in the original case, 270 out of 440 stable action–norm
pairs with a positive payoff realize perfect intragroup cooperation (Sec. 3.2.1).
The other 170 stable action–norm pairs yielding π > 0 are summarized in
Table 4. For all the stable action–norm pairs shown, σin = Disc. Table 4
indicates that outgroup favoritism does not occur.
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There are 18 rows in Table 4. For the two action–norm pairs shown in
the first row, the stability condition is given by brin > c and rin < 1/2. For
the two action–norm pairs shown in the sixth row, the stability condition is
given by brin > c and rin >
√
2− 1. For the four action–norm pairs shown in
the sixteenth row, the stability condition is given by b/c > (1 + rin)/rin. For
all the other action–norm pairs, the stability condition is given by brin > c.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of ingroup and outgroup observers. In A, the donor’s
group gd and the recipient’s group gr are identical. This event occurs with probability r
in.
In B, gd 6= gr. This event occurs with probability rout = 1− rin.
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Figure 2: Typical second-order social norms. The rows outside the boxes represent the
donor’s actions (C or D), and the columns represent the recipient’s reputations (G or B).
The entries inside the boxes represent the reputations that the observer assigns to the
donor in each case.
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Figure 3: Procedure for obtaining the stable action–norm pairs with perfect ingroup co-
operation shown in Tables 1 and 3.
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Table 1: Stable action–norm pairs with perfect ingroup cooperation under scenario 1.
The probability of cooperation with outgroup recipients, π, and p∗g are the values in the
limit ǫ → 0. sii = GBGG (standing), GBBG (judging), or GBBB (shunning). Action–
norm pairs only different in sii were distinguished when counting the number of stable
action–norm pairs. An asterisk indicates that both G and B apply.
State
Prob. C to
π σout p∗g
Social norm No.
outgroup (sio–soo) pairs
Full cooperation 1 b− c Disc 1 GB∗G–GB∗G 18
GBBB–GB∗G
Partial ingroup 1
2
(b−c)(1+rin)
2
Disc 1
2
GB∗G-GB∗B 12
favoritism
0 (b− c)rin AllD
1
∗GBB–∗G∗G
72∗GBG–∗G∗G
∗GGG–∗G∗G
Perfect ingroup 1
2
∗G∗G–∗G∗B
96
favoritism ∗G∗G–∗B∗G
0
BB∗G–∗B∗B
72BG∗G–∗B∗B
GG∗G–∗B∗B
Table 2: Conditions for stability of partial ingroup favoritism against group mutation
under scenario 1. The condition on rin is required for the three out of 12 social norms to
prevent the invasion by group mutants that defect against ingroup recipients and cooperate
with outgroup recipients.
Conditions
Social norm Social norm No.
(sii) (sio–soo) pairs
b > c GBGG, GBBG, or GBBB
GBBG–GBBB
9GBGG–GBBB
GBBG–GBGB
b > c and rin >
√
2− 1 GBGG GBGG–GBGB 1
b > c and rin > 1/2 GBBG or GBBB GBGG–GBGB 2
Table 3: Stable action–norm pairs with perfect ingroup cooperation under scenario 2. sii =
GBGG (standing) or GBBG (judging). Different action–norm pairs in the same row are
neutrally invadable to each other. An asterisk indicates either G or B.
State
Prob. C to
π σout p∗g
Social norm No.
outgroup (sio–soo) pairs
Full cooperation 1 b− c Disc 1 GB∗G–GBGG 8
GB∗G–GBBG
Partial ingroup 1
2
(b−c)(1+rin)
2
Disc 1
2
GB∗G–GBBB 4
favoritism
0 (b− c)rin AllD
1
∗G∗G–BGBG
32
∗G∗G–GGBG
∗G∗G–BGGG
∗G∗G–GGGG
1
2
∗G∗G–BGBB
64
∗G∗G–GGBB
∗G∗G–BGGB
Perfect ingroup ∗G∗G–GGGB
favoritism ∗G∗G–BBBG
∗G∗G–GBBG
∗G∗G–BBGG
∗G∗G–GBGG
0
∗G∗G–BBBB
32
∗G∗G–GBBB
∗G∗G–BBGB
∗G∗G–GBGB
Table 4: Stable action–norm pairs with a positive probability of cooperation that are not
included in Table 1. sii = GBGG (standing), GBBG (judging), or GBBB (shunning). An
asterisk indicates either G or B. The sixth and seventh rows in the table are not aggregated
because the stability condition is different between these cases (Appendix B).
Prob. C to Prob. C to
π σout p∗ p∗g
Social norm No.
ingroup outgroup (sii–sio–soo) pairs
1
2
1
2
b−c
2
Disc 1
2
1
2
GBBB-GBBB–GB∗B 2
1
2
0 (b−c)r
in
2
AllD 1
2
1
2
GBBB–∗GBB-∗G∗B
32
GBBB–BB∗G-∗G∗B
GBBB–∗GBB-∗B∗G
GBBB–BB∗G-∗B∗G
1+rin
2
1
2
(b−c)(1+(rin)2)
2
Disc 1+r
in
2
1
2
GB∗G–GBBB-GBGB
4
GB∗G–GBBB-GBBB
1+rin
2
0 (b−c)r
in(1+rin)
2
AllD 1+r
in
2
1
2
GB∗G–∗GBB–∗G∗B
64
GB∗G–BB∗G–∗G∗B
GB∗G–∗GBB–∗B∗G
GB∗G–BB∗G–∗B∗G
rin 0 (b− c)(rin)2
AllD
rin
1
GB∗G–BBBB-∗G∗G
68
GB∗G–BB∗G–∗G∗G
1
2
GB∗G–BBBB–∗G∗B
GB∗G–BBBB–∗B∗G
Disc
0
GB∗G–GBBB–BB∗B
AllD
GB∗G–BBBB–∗B∗B
GB∗G–∗GBB–∗B∗B
